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The Program on Alternative Investments at the Center onJapanese Economy and Business (CJEB) of Columbia
Business School and Columbia University’s Program for
Economic Research and Weatherhead East Asian Institute
cosponsored the symposium “Lessons from the Japanese
Bubble for the U.S.”  Amidst a deepening U.S. financial cri-
sis, 260 people attended to hear three specialists on the
Japanese economy discuss what can be learned from the
Japanese experience to help U.S. policymakers avoid a sys-
temic crisis and the “lost decade” that Japan went through
following the bursting of its asset bubble in the early 1990s.
The speakers were Takeo Hoshi, Pacific Economic Cooperation
Professor of International Economic Relations, University of
California, San Diego; Paul Sheard, global chief economist and
head of economic research, Nomura Securities International;
and Michael Woodford, John Bates Clark Professor of Political
Economy, Columbia University. Alicia Ogawa, director of the
Program on Alternative Investments, CJEB, commenced the
symposium with introductory remarks, and David Weinstein,
associate director for research, CJEB, and Carl S. Shoup
Professor of the Japanese Economy, Columbia University,
served as moderator. This report is a summary of the speakers’
presentations.
Professor Hoshi said crisis and change described Japan’s
financial system in the 1990s, and today those same words
describe the U.S. financial system. Each country’s financial
crisis was preceded by similar run-ups in real estate prices and
stock prices. Professor Hoshi pointed out that in Japan stock
prices peaked and collapsed just before real estate prices,
while in the United States the two happened almost simulta-
neously. Additionally, each country experienced the unexpected
failure of one of their largest financial institutions—Yamaichi
Securities in Japan and Lehman Brothers in the United States—
which in both cases led to a spike in interbank loan rates.
A popular myth, Professor Hoshi explained, is that the
Japanese government did nothing in response to the collapse
of the asset price bubble and the financial crisis that followed.
In fact, the recent approach of the U.S. government has resem-
bled closely that of the Japanese government. Both countries
started with a plan to purchase troubled assets and then shifted
the focus to recapitalization. The key difference between
the two governments’ approaches, however, is the speed with
which they first acted, and then adjusted their strategies. In
Japan, the asset purchases began in 1993, and it was not until
1998 that the government began to recapitalize banks. The
United States made the shift from asset purchase to recapi-
talization in only five days. Professor Hoshi said the Japanese
government’s slow reaction to the crisis is something for which
it has been rightly maligned.
Professor Hoshi then went into greater detail describing
the Japanese government’s recapitalization attempts, in order
to identify lessons for the United States. In total, the Japanese
government made five separate recapitalization attempts. The
Financial Function Stabilization Act, which was a halfhearted
first attempt at recapitalization that totaled about 1.8 tril-
lion yen, was passed in 1998. The plan injected the same
amount of capital into each bank, with the amount based on
what the strongest bank requested, and it guaranteed all bank
liabilities. This soon proved insufficient, and in 1999, under
the Prompt Recapitalization Act, the government made by
far its largest bank recapitalization attempt, injecting about
8.6 trillion yen. By 2006 there had been five recapitalization
episodes. It is now clear, Professor Hoshi said, that these recap-
italization attempts never were large enough to solve the capital
shortage problems of Japanese banks in the long run. He then
compared the 9 trillion yen figure with the cumulative losses
that Japanese banks suffered from nonperforming loans. By
2005 cumulative losses totaled over 96 trillion yen, about 19
percent of GDP—clearly dwarfing the amount injected. Professor
Hoshi said the question for the United States is whether the
250 billion USD that has been earmarked for recapitaliza-
tion is large enough, given that no one knows the amount of
troubled assets that still exist. Japan’s experience suggests
that small and repeated capital injections are, at best, only
temporary fixes. Professor Hoshi added that one aspect in
which the U.S. government has fared better than the Japanese
government is in convincing financial institutions to accept
public funds. In Japan, banks felt that selling the govern-
ment preferred shares would suggest insolvency, thus stirring
up concern among common shareholders. This has not been a
problem in the United States.
In conclusion, Professor Hoshi identified two final lessons
for U.S. recapitalization policy: the government must conduct
due diligence of the financial institutions receiving public funds,
and banks that receive public funds should not be forced to
lend to small- and medium-sized firms. In Japan, many small
but important regional banks were recapitalized, only to even-
tually fail. Additionally, because the goal of recapitalization
is to enable banks to continue to extend credit, the Japanese
government opted to require banks to lend to small- and medium-
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sized firms. This policy kept credit open to many insolvent “zom-
bie” firms, Professor Hoshi said, a fact that contributed to
Japan’s subsequent decade of economic malaise.
Mr. Sheard built on Professor Hoshi’s presentation by clar-
ifying some of the key differences between the Japanese
and U.S. crises and described some further lessons. In Japan,
the source of the crisis was a bubble in commercial real estate
and equity market asset prices. Japan’s problem, therefore,
was essentially nonperforming loans affecting the solvency of
the commercial banking system. In the United States, the
source of the crisis has been a housing market bubble involv-
ing subprime loans and mortgage-backed securities with very
complex financial structures. Therefore, compared to Japan’s
crisis, what is happening in the United States is much more of
a market liquidity problem—as it also is in Europe and the United
Kingdom. This has led to rising spreads across a range of prod-
ucts and caused serious dysfunction in large segments of
the financial system. Mr. Sheard stressed that the reach of the
U.S. crisis is much greater than it was in Japan. Whereas Japan’s
crisis was very localized, the U.S. crisis has had global con-
sequences, since bad assets were securitized and spread
throughout the global financial system. Hence, it is a far more
complex problem to address compared to the Japanese crisis,
which was concentrated in about twenty financial institutions.  
Mr. Sheard agreed with Professor Hoshi’s analysis of the
Japanese government’s attempts to purchase bad assets and
recapitalize the banks. He also noted that the Japanese gov-
ernment was right to recognize the danger of bank runs in 1995
and announce a blanket guarantee on bank deposits, which
quelled the financial instability. These strategies, combined
with unconventional monetary policy, constituted a compre-
hensive Japanese approach from which the United States can
learn, Mr. Sheard said. But he added that the Japanese gov-
ernment acted far too slowly and timidly on all accounts. The
policy of forbearance in response to the crisis contributed to
Japan’s so-called “lost decade”—a mistake that should serve
as a key lesson for the United States. For example, Japan
did not guarantee bank deposits until 1995, even though by
1991 it was evident that real estate prices were plummeting.
Furthermore, it was not until 1998 that the deposit guaran-
tee was funded and an institutional infrastructure was
implemented to deal with the troubled assets. The Japanese
government’s reluctance to commit public funds and then to
use them demonstrated a lack of political leadership, Mr. Sheard
said. In a financial crisis, governments must trust the public’s
intelligence and make a convincing case that injecting public
funds and thereby increasing the budget deficit is the best
strategy to minimize losses. Regarding monetary policy, Mr.
Sheard argued that the Bank of Japan’s quantitative easing
that began in 2001 was far too late and was conducted in a
somewhat self-defeating manner. Furthermore, the combina-
tion of timid monetary policy and counterproductive fiscal 
policy resulted in a macroeconomic strategy that failed to
restore aggregate demand, defeat deflation, and return the
Japanese economy to growth, he said.
Mr. Sheard next defined some general characteristics of
financial crises and the monumental policy challenges they
pose. Financial crises require remedial market intervention,
which is very difficult to get right and runs contrary to the 
typical role of policy in a market economy. Additionally, pol-
icy makers operate under extreme uncertainty, and any action
or inaction will be criticized. The more successful a policy is,
the more it appears excessive ex post. Mr. Sheard was adamant
that moral hazard arguments are dangerous when dealing with
a financial crisis because they complicate the objective of the
policy maker. This objective, he emphasized, should be to ensure
that the economy returns to a high equilibrium path, no mat-
ter how valid moral hazard arguments seem at the micro level.
Mr. Sheard said Japan’s policy of forbearance allowed the finan-
cial crisis to persist, and once the economy became deflationary,
self-reinforcing feedbacks kept the economy on a low equi-
librium path. He suggested that the United States is
experiencing a slight but dangerous parallel with the severe
distrust of counterparties and shortage of liquidity, which
are causing the dysfunction of the capital market infrastruc-
ture. Even if the U.S. government deals effectively with the
initial cause of the financial crisis—the housing market—there
may be subsequent problems of sufficient magnitude to pre-
vent the economy from getting back on a higher equilibrium
path. Mr. Sheard ventured that the U.S. Treasury and Federal
Reserve may have recognized this situation, saying this fact
could explain their recent dramatic actions.
In closing, Mr. Sheard listed five general principles for deal-
ing with a financial crises based on the Japanese experience:
(1) diagnose and take action early; (2) stem the financial crisis;
(3) attack the underlying problem; (4) implement a coordinated
and aggressive policy response; and (5) have a longer-term
game plan that includes an exit and correction strategy. In
his opinion the United States has done well in most of these
respects, but it remains to be seen whether it has effectively
attacked the underlying problem and will be able to success-
fully negotiate an exit and correction strategy. Through the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and other programs to
prevent foreclosures, the U.S. government is trying to improve
the asset value behind all the securities that are causing 
distress in the financial system. If the government backs off
this strategy, it lessens its ability to address the underlying
housing market problem, Mr. Sheard said. With respect to an
exit strategy from the recent socialization, he said it must be
sought as soon as possible and achieved through mechanisms
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such as initial public offerings of government-acquired equity
stakes. Finally, after there is adequate recovery from the finan-
cial crisis, a broad correction strategy is required to prevent
the mistakes that led to the financial crisis and to address
the moral hazard issues. Mr. Sheard suggested that this requires
a breadth of new regulations, institutional rebuilding, and mar-
ket learning.
Professor Woodford addressed the specific lessons that
Japanese monetary policy in the post-bubble years holds for
the United States today. Responding to the economic contrac-
tion in the early 1990s, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) began cutting
the nominal call rate—roughly equivalent to the nominal fed-
eral funds rate in the United States—fairly aggressively, from
over 8.0 percent in 1991 to 0.5 percent in the fall of 1995.
By March 1999 the call rate was cut to zero, yet the consumer
price index (CPI) inflation and GDP growth remained negative.
The BOJ’s dilemma was that the economy still needed demand
stimulus, but the conventional tool of cutting the call rate
had been exhausted, and the bank feared that monetary pol-
icy had become impotent. Professor Woodford said that the
U.S. Federal Reserve was facing essentially the same prob-
lem, since—at the time of his presentation—the federal funds
rate had been cut to 1 percent, meaning there was very little
room left for further loosening, yet there appeared to be insuf-
ficient demand stimulus to avoid a serious recession and possibly
even deflation.
In Japan’s case, after much international pressure, the BOJ
in 2001 resorted to an experimental quantitative easing
(QE) policy, in which the BOJ’s operating target become the
current account balances of the banks, not the call rate, which
remained at zero. The BOJ committed to continue this policy
until deflation ended. By 2006, the BOJ had successively
expanded the monetary base by 74 percent, yet nominal GDP
had actually fallen slightly from 2001. To a large extent, the
additional monetary base had been held as excess reserves
by banks and the effect on aggregate demand was minimal, as
evidenced by the relative stability of broader monetary aggre-
gate measures like M2 and CDs. Professor Woodford explained
this phenomenon by saying that, in theory, the effect of expand-
ing the monetary base during ZIRP (zero interest rate policy)
on aggregate demand depends on the extent to which expec-
tations change regarding how long ZIRP will last or what
monetary policy will look like after ZIRP. If QE is perceived as
a very temporary solution that will be followed by rapid con-
tractionary policy, there is no reason to expect an immediate
positive effect on aggregate demand, he argued. In Japan,
there was no indication of what would be done with mone-
tary policy after ZIRP. Professor Woodford reasoned that
expectations were that the BOJ would pursue very contrac-
tionary policy, and indeed, after ZIRP was abandoned in 2006,
the BOJ did exactly that. He said the QE policy in Japan was
effective to the extent that it signaled that ZIRP would be main-
tained until deflation ended, causing longer-term interest rates
to fall. One lesson from this for the United States is that sig-
naling the conditions under which very low interest rate policy
will be abandoned should be an effective tool on its own.
Professor Woodford went on to discuss in greater detail
the importance of signaling the future path of interest rates,
and he elucidated some further lessons that can be drawn from
Japan’s monetary policy. In April 1999, shortly after ZIRP
began, the BOJ made its first direct attempt to signal future
monetary policy. The BOJ realized that long-term interest rates
were not falling, and popular expectation was that ZIRP would
be abandoned quickly. Accordingly, BOJ governor Masaru
Hayami announced that the bank was committed to ZIRP until
deflation was no longer a concern. Professor Woodford noted
that some people say this speech further lowered implied
forward rates. However, he pointed out that there were also
many contradictory signs suggesting the Bank was uncom-
fortable maintaining ZIRP. In August 2000, at the first indication
of economic recovery, the BOJ raised the call rate 25 basis
points. According to Professor Woodford, this small rate hike
was more significant for the signal it sent about future mon-
etary policy than its economic effect. The signal confirmed that
the BOJ was eager to find a reason to raise rates. Term struc-
ture data from this time reveals that tightening was anticipated
and likely caused the economic recovery to stall later in 2000,
Professor Woodford said. 
The BOJ’s commitment to QE policy in 2001, which effec-
tively signaled that it would maintain ZIRP until the year-on-year
increase in CPI was positive, had a more robust positive effect
than Governor Hayami’s announcement in 1999, and even-
tually led to sustained mild economic recovery. Nevertheless,
said Professor Woodford, there are important lessons for the
Federal Reserve to learn with respect to why the QE policy was
not more effective in creating aggregate demand. The BOJ sig-
naled they would not raise the call rate from zero as long as
deflation persisted, but it did not specify a plan for reflation.
The first lesson is that the conditions under which accommoda-
tive policy will be terminated must include specific reflation
targets to allay fears of continuing inflation. The second les-
son pertains to the current expansion of the Federal Reserve’s
balance sheet. Professor Woodford said that when the BOJ
pursued QE, the monetary base expansion was so dramatic
that it was self-defeating because no one expected the BOJ
to leave that amount of money in circulation. According to
Professor Woodford, the Federal Reserve should signal that
they are expanding the Central Bank’s balance sheet consis-
tent with their calculation of how much money should be in the
economy after reflation is successful. 
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